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Mandatory Arbitration of Title VII
Claims: A New Approach
PrudentialInsurance Co. of America v. Lail

I. INTRODUCTION
Many employees sign arbitration agreements as part of the hiring process.
Often, these agreements are standardized forms composed by an employer or
industry, and presented to the prospective employee as yet another form essential
to employment. When the dispute that arises involves Title VII claims, should the
employee be compelled to arbitrate those claims? This note examines one court's
approach to safeguarding judicial resolution of Title VII claims, as well as
alternative approaches.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Appellants Justine Lai and Elvira Viemes were employed by the Prudential
Insurance Co. of America ("Prudential") as sales representatives. On November
30, 1990, they sued Prudential and their immediate supervisor in state court,
alleging that the supervisor had raped, harassed, and sexually abused them
Prudential then filed a claim in federal district court to compel arbitration of Ms.
Lai's and Ms. Viernes' claims pursuant to an agreement that each woman signed
when applying to Prudential for employment.' This agreement, called the
Standard Application for Securities Industry Registration ("U-4 form"), provided
that any employment-related claim would be arbitrated under the rules of the
organizations with which the employee registered.5 Ms. Lai and Ms. Viernes
registered with the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), which
requires arbitration of disputes originating from the business of its members. 6

1. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cer. denied, 116 S.CL 61 (1995).
2. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1301 (9th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 116

s.Ct 61 (1995).
3. Id.
4. Id
5. Id. at 1302. The relevant clause of the U-4 form states: "I agree to arbitrate any dispute,
claim or controversy that may arise between me or my firm, or a customer, or any other person,
that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or bylaws of the organizations with
which I register.. "Id.
6. Id. at 1301. The NASD Manual and Code of Arbitration Procedure provides: "Any dispute,
claim or controversy eligible for submission under part I of this Code between or among members
and or associated persons ...arising inconnection with the business of such members or in
connection with the activities of such associated person(s), shall be arbitrated under this Code...."
Id. at 1302.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

1

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1996, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 15
[Vol. 1996, No. I
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In federal district court, Prudential moved to stay the state court proceedings
and to compel arbitration of appellants' claims.' The district court granted both
motions, agreeing with Prudential's position that the enforceability of the
arbitration agreement was a question for the arbitrator to decide.'
On appeal, Ms. Lai and Ms. Viernes argued that they could not be bound by
the arbitration agreement because they were unaware of it.9 They claimed that
the nature of the U-4 form was not explained and that they did not have a chance

to read it.'0 Furthermore, they never received a copy of the NASD manual
containing its arbitration agreement."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit defined the major

issue before the court as whether the appellants entered into a binding arbitration
agreement, and in consequence, waived rights available to them under Title V11 2
and similar state statutes.' 3 The court held that when an individual has not
knowingly agreed to waive her Title VII rights and remedies, she cannot be
compelled to arbitrate those claims. 4

M.

LEGAL HISTORY

The Ninth Circuit decision came down in the context of a number of
decisions compelling arbitration of claims based on Title VII and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")"5 pursuant to the ubiquitous
Securities Registration Form U4. 6 Courts have based their decisions on the
United States Supreme Court's influential 1991 decision in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.' 7 To understand the significance of the Ninth
Circuit's heightened standard for the validity of agreements to arbitrate certain

7. Id at 1301.
8. Id at 1301, 1303.
9. rd. at 1303.
10. Id.at 1301.
11. Id.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1988).
13. Lai, 42 F.3d at 1303. Parallel state anti-discrimination laws are included in Tile VII's
enforcement scheme by its terms. Id.
14. Id. at 1305. The appealability of the district court's order compelling arbitration was a
threshold issue before the Ninth Circuit. The court noted the Federal Arbitration Act's ("FAA")
general rule that an order compelling arbitration is not an appealable final judgment However, the
FAA makes an exception for "final judgment with respect to an arbitration." The Ninth Circuit
held that where the motion to compel arbitration is the only claim before the court, the order
compelling arbitration settles all claims before that court, and is an appealable final judgment Id.
15.

29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).

16. See, e.g., Kidd v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States, 32 F.3d 516 (1 1th
Cir. 1994); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994);
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991); Willis v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
17.

500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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statutory claims, it is important to understand the impact of Gilmer and how it
changed the law that appellate courts were applying to arbitration and statutory

discrimination claims.
A. Alexander and the Law Priorto Gilmer
Prior to Gilmer, potential plaintiffs could rely on the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo."8 to preserve a judicial
forum for their Title VII or ADEA complaints despite arbitration agreements such
as that contained in the U-4 form. 9 Alexander held that there could be no
prospective waiver of an employee's Title VII rights. ° In that case, arbitration
had taken place in accord with a collective bargaining agreement, but the plaintiff
in Alexander also wished to pursue a private civil action.2'
The Court focused on the purpose and procedures of Title VII to find that
Congress intended federal courts to retain final authority over enforcement of Title
VII.2
The Court described the private cause of action as "essential" to the
enforcement of Title VII and noted that such claimants '"indicate the important
Congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices" as well as their

own claims.'

The Court also pointed out that the language of Title VII itself

private action when the parties have availed themselves of
does not preclude
24
arbitration.
Furthermore, while acknowledging the value of arbitration for contract
disputes, the Court questioned the suitability of arbitral pro cedures for enforcement
of Title VII rights.2 ' The Court said that arbitration does not take adequate
notice of judicial construction; is more likely to focus on giving effect to the
contract26involved rather than legislation; and the entire fact finding process is too
limited.
AfterAlexander, appellate courts embracedthe Court's reasoning to hold that
the Title VII cause of action could not be prospectively waived and that employees
could not be compelled to arbitrate those claims pursuant to U-4 or other
commercial arbitration agreements.

18.
19.

415 U.S. 36 (1974).
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 51.
Id. at 38, 43.
Id. at 56.
Id at 45.
Id. at 47.

25. Id. at 56.
26. Id. at 57. Deficiencies in the fact-finding process include the curtailment or elimination
of the record, the rules of evidence, discovery, cross-examination and testimony. Id at 57-58.
27. See e.g., Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d. 1304 (8th Cir. 1988);
Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d. 184 (lat Cir. 1989); Schwartz v. Florida Bd. of Regents,
807 F.2d. 901 (11th Cir. 1987).
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In Swenson v. Management Recruiters International, Inc.,28 the Eighth
Circuit relied on Alexander to hold that Swenson could not be compelled to
arbitrate her Title VII racial and sexual discrimination claims even though she had
signed an agreement with her employer containing an arbitration clause. 29 The
Eighth Circuit agreed with the Supreme Court that the arbitral forum had
deficiencies making it inadequate for the vindication of Title VII rights. ° The
court reiterated that the substantial public interest in preventing employment
discrimination could best be served by keeping the judicial forum available to Title
VII claimants.3 ' The court went on to say that although Alexander involved a
collectivebargaining agreement, the decision turned on "the unique nature of Title
VII" rather than the type of agreement.32
The First Circuit interpreted Alexander the same way in Utley v. Goldman
Sachs & Co. 3 3 Utley, like the instant case, involved the U-4 form.3 4 The First
Circuit refused to compel arbitration of a sales associate's Title VII claims based
on the reasoning in Alexander.3 The court noted that recent United States
Supreme Court decisions asserted a federal policy favoring arbitration, placing the
burden on the party opposing arbitration to show Congress intended that judicial
remedies could not be waived by arbitration agreements. 36 The court found the
necessary congressional intent in the text of Title VII itself, which expressly
provided a private cause of action without mandating arbitration, and also in the
tradition7 of preserving the adjudication of Constitutional rights in the Article III
3
courts.
Like the Eighth Circuit, the First Circuit found the type of employment
agreement involved was irrelevant to the proposition in Alexander that the
importance of Title VII enforcement and the drawbacks of the arbitral forum
precluded the prospective waiver of the judicial forum 3
B. Gilmer and Subsequent Decisions
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer made a dramatic
change in the way the federal courts approached agreements to arbitrate statutory

28. 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988).
29. Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1306-07.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1305.
32. Id. at 1306.
33. 883 F.2d 184 (1st. Cir. 1989).
34. Utley, 883 F.2d at 185.
35. Id. at 187.
36. Id. at 186 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
37. Id. at 187.
38. Id
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claims in the context of employment discrimination.

9

The plaintiff in Gilmer

was a securities representative who signed the U-4 registration application.4"
his employer moved to compel
When Gilmer brought a claim under the ADEA,
41
arbitration pursuant to the U-4 agreement.
In Gilmer, the Court emphasized the congressional purpose in enacting the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 42 to promote arbitration by treating arbitration
agreements as having the same status as any other contract.43 Under the FAA,
a party is bound by an arbitration agreement unless she can show that Congress
intended to preclude waiver of a judicial forum for the statutory rights involved."
The claimant may rely on the statutory text, legislative history, or an "inherent
conflict" between arbitration and the statute's purpose. 45 The Court observed that
statutory claimants do not give up substantive rights when they abide by their
arbitration agreements; they are merely determined through arbitration rather than
a judicial forum.46 Apparently, in this decision, the FAA was accorded the high
priority that Title VII was accorded in the Alexander decision. Therefore, the
Court took a new approach to the suitability of arbitration procedures, finding
them sufficient both to protect individual rights and to generally promote the
purposes of the ADEA.47
The Court did not go so far as to over-rule Alexander, but sharply
distinguished it and essentially limited it to its facts. 4' The opinion identified the
issue in Alexander as whether the arbitration of contract-based claims under a
collective bargaining agreement precluded bringing statutory claims based on the
same events in court, while Gilmer regarded the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement. 4' Furthermore, the Court emphasized that collective bargaining
agreements raise concerns that private agreements do not.50 The point was to
"ensure that an individual's statutory rights were not lost in the collective

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
interests
34.

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
Id. at 23.
Id. at 23-24.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1988).
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30-32.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. Of primary concern was that the interests of the individual might be secondary to the
of the group of employees that were party to the collective bargaining agreement. Id at

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

5

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1996, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 15
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
[Vol. 1996, No. I
bargaining process."'" Finally, the Court noted that Alexander was not decided
under the FAA, which states a strong presumption in favor of arbitrability.5 2
The Court signalled the effect of this decision by remanding Alford v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc.," a Fifth Circuit decision decided under the Alexander
standard, for reconsideration in light of Gilmer.54 The Fifth Circuit had
originally held that Alford could not be compelled to arbitrate her Title VII
claims." On remand, the Fifth Circuit noted that the applicablepolicy arguments
had been dismissed by Gilmer, and reversed the earlier decision.56 While Gilmer
involved the ADEA, the Fifth Circuit found that it was pertinent to Title VII
claims because the statutes at issue were similar civil rights statutes with similar
enforcement schemes.
This was just the first of several similar appellate court decisions to compel
arbitration of Title VII claims after Gilmer.5' These cases tend to be factually
similar to the instant case; all involve Title VII claimants whose employers sought
to compel arbitration of those claims pursuant to a U-4 agreement. 9
The Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.60 is
representative. 6' The court stated that Alexander could no longer be read to
proscribe arbitration of Title VII claims pursuant to agreements, and that it had
been effectively distinguished from the type of case before the court.6 2 The court
found that Gilmer controlled for that reason, and because of the Supreme Court's
remand of Alford.63
Following Gilmer, the Sixth Circuit found that Willis' arguments based on
the important policy concerns embodied by Title VII, its enforcement scheme, and
the importance of judicial review (which is absent from the arbitral procedure)
were foreclosed." It appeared that if an employee had signed the U4 or a
similar form in order to do his job, and his employer invoked the arbitration

51. Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (1Ith Cir. 1992).
52. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
53. 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
54. Afford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
55. Id
56. Id. at 230.
57. Id.
58. See e.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994);
Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992); Willis v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
59. Willis, 948 F.2d at 306; Metz, 39 F.3d at 1486; Bender, 971 F.2d at 699.
60. 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
61. Willis, 948 F.2d at 305.
62. Id at 308.
63. Id
64. Id.
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clause, then there was no avenue left for him to get his claim to court as a Title
VII claimant.65
IV. INSTANT DECISION
Since Gilmer and subsequent lower court decisions such as Willis have

effectively concluded that statutory discrimination claims can be subject to
mandatory arbitration, the Ninth Circuit took a novel approach in Lai." The
Ninth Circuit first framed the issue as whether there was a binding agreement, and

then set a high standard for concluding that the agreement was binding. 67
The court adopted the position that Congress intended that there be at least

knowing agreement to arbitrate claims such as those covered by Title VII before
the rights, remedies, and procedural protections detailed in Title VII can be

waived.6' Drawing support for this position from the text and legislative history
of Title VII, the court revived many of the policy arguments utilized in the
Alexander opinion. 69 Like the United States Supreme Court in Alexander, the
Ninth Circuit emphasized that Congress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, intended
the policy against discrimination to be of the "highest priority. '70 Title VII
provided for several forums to better carry out this policy and generally preserved

other options when a claimant had taken advantage of one of the
access to
71
forums.

The court found further support in the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 ("Act"), 72 which amends Title VII, particularly in a related House

65. One circuit court refused to compel arbitration of an ADEA claim pursuant to a U-4
agreement based on the language of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure. Farrand v.
Lutheran Bhd., 993 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993). The Seventh Circuit read the agreement language
to exclude arbitration of employee disputes between a member of NASD and one of the member's
registered representatives. Id. at 1255. The court also said that Gilmer did not stand for a blanket
presumption in favor of arbitration; rather, it construed a specific contract. Id,at 1255. This
decision has been criticized. Kidd, 32 F.3d at 519; O'Donnell v. First Investors Corp., 872 F. Supp.
1274, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Strappes Group, Inc. v. Siedle, No. CV 93-11385-K, 1993 WL
443926, at *4 (D. Mass. Nov. 22, 1993). The Seventh Circuit's approach is probably of limited
availability to future cases anyway since the NASD amended the Code in 1993 to expressly include
arbitration of employee related disputes. Kidd, 32 F.3d at 518.
66. 42 F.3d 1299.
67. Id. at 1303, 1304.
68. Id. at 1304.
69. Id
70. Id
71. Id
72. Id (citing Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended).
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of Representative's report.73 Speaking of section 118, which encourages the use
of arbitration to settle claims under the Act, the House report explains that
alternative dispute resolution should supplement rather than replace Title VII civil
remedies. 74 The court quoted Senator Dole's comments on section 118, saying
that arbitration would be appropriate only "where the parties knowingly and
voluntarily elect to use these methods.""
The Ninth Circuit adopted "knowing waiver" as the appropriate standard for
a valid arbitration agreement when Title VII rights are at stake. 76 The court said
that this was consistent with the paramount public policy in favor of aiding victims
of sexual discrimination and harassment.77 The Ninth Circuit stated that this
public policy "is at least as strong as our public policy in favor of arbitration."7'
The court went on to discuss the significance of the procedural protections
unique to adjudication, which had been down-played in Gilmer.79 The court
noted that this could be particularly important in the context of the instant sexual
harassment claims.80 For example, California statutes (analogous to Title V1U)
limit the admissibility of a plaintiff's sexual history in judicial proceedings."
Furthermore, a sexual harassment claimant might especially value a jury of her
peers over a NASD panel.8 2 The court indicated that it was not enough to say,
as did the Supreme Court in MitsubishiMotors and Gilmer, that claimants merely
utilize a different forum by submitting to arbitration and do not forego substantive
rights.
Applied to the instant case, the court found that the claimants could not have
been bound by the arbitration agreement because they did not knowingly give up
their statutory remedies.' The court based this finding not only on the fact Ms.
Lai and Ms. Viernes had no opportunity to read the terms of the agreement and
were misled as to its contents, 5 but also on the U-4 form's failure to describe
what disputes were arbitrable under the agreement.8 6

73. Id (citing H.R. RE. No.40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549).
74. Id (citing 137 CONG. REc. S15472 (daily ed. October 30, 1991Xstatement of Sen. Dole)).
75. Id. at 1305 (citing 137 CONG. REc. S15472 (daily ed. October 30, 1991)(statement of
Sen. Dole)).
76. Id
77. Id
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81.

Id. at 1305 i4.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id
Id at 1305 (citing Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 47). See also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
Id.
Id
Id
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In short, the court held that a Title VII plaintiff may only be compelled to
arbitrate statutory claims if he or she has knowingly agreed to arbitrate that type
of dispute."' The Lai court did not find that the plaintiffs "knowingly agreed"
to, or were given notice, that they were giving up Title VII adjudication because
the agreement did not specify the types of disputes subject to arbitration.88

V. COMMENT
In Alexander, the Supreme Court articulated persuasive policy reasons for
preserving the right to judicial resolution of Title VII claims.8 9 Primary among
these were the importance of "an individual's right to equal employment
opportunity"' and the fact that, through the courts, not only is the wrong
individual compensated, the general policy against employment discrimination is
advanced. 9 As one author pointed out, the public nature of court proceedings,
discovery, and reported decisions play a significant role in furthering Title VII
policies. 92 Discovery, in particular, can be useful in revealing a pattern of
discrimination.93 Reported decisions provide for the accumulation of a body of
law that Title VII plaintiffs can depend on and that can shape employers'
behavior. 94
These policies would seem to transcend the facts of Alexander, but Gilmer
apparently removed them from the analysis. Lai reintroduced them, not in the
analysis of whether Title VII claimants can be compelled to arbitrate statutory
claims, but in deciding whether the underlying agreement is valid. For the
immediate future, Lai could be a useful tool for courts that are reluctant to deprive
plaintiffs of a judicial forum for statutory discrimination claims.
Lai has been raised by some Title VII claimants with mixed results. 95 The
Northern District of California fully adopted the reasoning and holding in Lai to
preserve the judicial forum for a Title VII plaintiff who had signed the U-4

87. Id at 1304.
88. Id. at 1305.
89. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51.
90. Id
91. Id. at 45.
92. Heidi M. Hellekson, Taking the "Alternative"Out of the Dispute Resolution of Title VII
Claims: The Implications of a Mandatory Enforcement Scheme of Arbitration Agreements Arising
Out of Employment Contracts, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 435, 449-51 (1994).
93. Id at 449, 50.
94. Id. al451.
95. Hurst v. Prudential Sec. Inc., No. C-90-2930, 1995 WL 419742 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 10, 1995);
Lomeli v. North Cent. Conn. Anesthesia Assoc., No. CV94 0541335, 1995 WL 370785 (Conn.
Super. CL Jun. 9, 1995); Hall v. Metlife Resources, No. 94 Civ. 0358, 1995 WL 258061 (S.D.N.Y.
May 3, 1995).
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agreement." In Hurst v. PrudentialSecuritiesInc., a different panel of the Ninth

Circuit rendered a decision compelling arbitration based on Gilmer and prior to
Lai.' The district court held that Lai constituted a change in the law that
"altered or called attention to a rule of law concerning the necessity that
employees understand that U-4 Forms compel arbitration" and restored the case
to the trial calendar. 98
The Ninth Circuit's Lai decision has, of course, great weight in the Northern
District of California. Perhaps what is most significant is that the Ninth Circuit
when deciding Hurst, refused to distinguish the case before it on the basis that
there was no misrepresentation of the U-4 agreement as was alleged in Lai."9
"Knowing agreement" is a tougher standard under this broad interpretation of Lai.
The Superior Court of Connecticut took a much narrower view in Lomeli v.
North CentralConnecticutAnesthesia Associates."°° In that case, a discrimination

plaintiff relied on Lai to argue against having her claim referred to an arbitrator
pursuant to an employment contract. "' The court found the cases to be factually
distinguishable." The court noted that the plaintiffs in Lai allegedly had not
read their contract and didn't know that it contained an arbitration clause. 3
This ignores the language in the Lai opinion that points out that even if the
plaintiffs had read the relative agreements, they could not be put on notice that
they would be required to arbitrate Title VII claims. Given the opportunity, the
Lomeli court declined to adopt the reasoning in Lai and preserve the judicial forum
for statutory discrimination claims.
The Southern District of New York explicitly rejected the reasoning of the
Lai court in Hall v. Metlife Resources.'4 Like Lai, Hall also involved a Title
VII claim and a U-4 agreement.' Early in its discussion, the court established
that there is a "strong presumption in favor of arbitrability." 1°6 The court said
that Gilmer made it clear that the U-4 binds an employee to arbitrate a statutory
discrimination claim." Furthermore, the court did not agree with the Ninth
Circuit that an arbitration agreement amomnted to a waiver of substantive statutory

96. Hurst, 1995 WL 419742 at *6.
97. Id. at *4.
98. Id at *6.
99. Id
100. Lomeli, 1995 WL 370785 at *1.
101. Id at *1.
102. Id
103. Id
104. Hall, 1995 WL 258061 at*4.
105. Id
106. Id at *2.
107. Id at *4.The Eastern District of New York also rejected the Lai court's reasoning as
contrary to Gilmer in a decision dated November 20, 1995. Pitter v. The Prudential Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 906 F. Supp. 130, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
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rights.'
This is reminiscent of the Gilmer Court's assertion that claimants do
not forgo substantive rights when signing arbitration agreements, but merely agree
to their resolution in another forum. 109
It is unclear whether courts will embrace the Lai court's analysis as a means
to avoid compelling the arbitration of statutory discrimination claims. Should they
do so, it is still an open question what factors would make the waiver of Title VII
rights "knowing." One commentator predicts that those factors would be the
language of the arbitration agreement, the employee's awareness of the agreement,
and the employee's understanding of what the agreement required." ° These
factors would require extensive fact-finding."'
The importance of the language of the agreement as a factor in determining
whether there was knowing waiver points out one problem with the Lai analysis.
In Lai, it was dispositive that the language of the U-4 form and the NASD manual
did not specify that Title VII or any other particular type of dispute was subject
to arbitration." 2 If these documents were amended to explicitly include Title
VII disputes, there would apparently be a valid arbitration agreementunder the Lai
analysis. However, it would still be true that employees would have no
meaningful choice as to signing these agreements. Since employees are often
required to sign U-4 forms to obtain and keep certain jobs, they are seldom in a
position to freely bargain the terms of these forms. Perhaps voluntariness should
have been part of the standard for a valid agreement."' The importance of
voluntary waiver also appears in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1991." 4 One commentator reports that the Clinton Administration Commission
on the Future of Worker-Management Relations recommended in January 1995
that all employment arbitration should be voluntary." 5
Since the U-4 and other arbitration agreements can be drafted to get around
the Lai holding if that view becomes prevailing in the courts, the Lai approach
may be useful only for the short term. One author has taken a longer view and
recommended that Congress amend the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as well as the
Americans with Disabilities Act. 116 The suggested amendment would provide
for a judicial trial de novo following final arbitration conducted pursuant to pre-

108.
109.
110.
119, 120
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Hall, 1995 WL 258061 at *4.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
Arbitrability-Statutory Rights Waiver, PrudentialIns. Co. v. Lai, 10 FED. LITIGATOR
(June 1995).
Id.
Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305.
Hellekson, supra note 92, at 438.
Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305.
S. Gale Dick, Court Limits Requirement to Arbitrate, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST

LrTo. 13, 19 (Feb. 1995).
116. Douglas E. Abrams, Arbitrability in Recent Federal Civil Rights Legislation: The Need
for Amendment, 26 CONN. L. REV. 521 (1994).
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dispute arbitration agreements. 1' 7 This proposal is based on two considerations.
First, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 indicates a concern
that alternative dispute resolution not replace Title VII judicial remedies. '
However, this concern is not reflected in the actual text of the Act." 9 Second,
role in protecting equality
civil rights statutes such as Title VII serve a "unique"
20
and redressing past and present discrimination.
Specifically, a prospective amendment should limit the right to a trial de novo
to arbitration conducted pursuant to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, and to the
party who is a member of the statutorily protected class.' 2 ' Post-dispute
arbitration agreements are not included because they come about in a situation
where both parties have had a chance to evaluate their particular case and to
choose the appropriate course accordingly. 122 The reason for the second
limitation is that arbitration may be the appropriate choice for a claimant who
wishes to take advantage of its privacy, speed, and lower costs. If that is the case,
able to insist on
the other party, normally in a stronger position, should not be
23
litigation and thereby run up expenses and delay resolution.
VI. CONCLUSION
A Title VII claimant who finds herself held to an arbitration agreement

contained in a form contract signed as a condition of employment may find it
useful to rely on Lai. In addition to asserting that there must be knowing
agreement for there to be a valid waiver of Title VII claims, a claimant should

assert that it must be voluntary as well. While the Lai court did not make this
part of their standard, it follows from the same legislative history and policy

arguments utilized by the Ninth Circuit. Ultimately, it would be desirable to
amend the statute so that the judicial forum is clearly and effectivelypreserved for
Title VII claimants who choose it despite arbitration agreements. The importance
of the individual's right to be free from discrimination and the necessity of
developing a body of law that can affect employer behavior and further the goals
of Title VII support this course.
CATHERINE CHATMAN
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